One of the reliable arguments, among the majority of Muslim philosophers for proving the existence of God, is the cosmological argument. Avicenna, in his book “ al_Ishā rā t” , has a particular reading of this argument, which claims to be independent from the creation to proving the creator. So only by considering existence per se, he has proved the existence of God and has called this argument “ The righteous” argument. Apparently later philosophers have initially accepted this term and have criticized him using his own criterion. They have questioned if the term is adequate. Two fundamental critiques have been raised. One is that this argument is based on impossibility of INFINITE and circular REGRESS and the second is that in the argument, the quiddity has been applied as a premise. In this study it will be shown that the argument is not in need for impossibility of INFINITE REGRESS, but it will be also explained that against Avicenna’ s claims, in this argument the necessary being is not derived from the existence per se and the concept of quiddity plays a role in this argument. We cannot call this argument “ The righteous” argument as regarded in Mulla Sadra’ s philosophy. Nevertheless, in peripatetic school, it’ s the most direct argument for proving the existence of God.

In his theory of meaning, Frege introduces sinn (=sense) as mode of presentation of bedeutung (=referent). Since, in propositional attitudes, ordinary sinn, according to Frege, is itself a bedeutung, there is another sinn, called “ indirect sense” , in which the mode of presentation of ordinary sinn is contained. Now in nested propositional attitudes the relation between sinn and bedeutung leads to INFINITE REGRESS which is not acceptable in a theory of meaning. In the present article, we have examined this REGRESS and concluded that Frege’ s theory needs to be amended and that the INFINITE REGRESS does not arise as a result of such amendment.

Some objections to the mental existence that are proposed by the western thinkers are unknown to Muslim philosophers. For example, Husserl says that if we accept the mental existence, then there will be an INFINITE REGRESS in object:object  “idea of object”  “object of “idea of object””  “idea of “object of “idea of object”””  “object of “idea of “object of “idea of object”””” ⁞We will try to find a resolution to the objection – that refutes the mental existence – by means of a rational method and based on some of the principles of Muslim Philosophy. Although Muslim philosophers have not been engaged in the very INFINITE REGRESS objection, they have been done in similar ones and said that: such INFINITE REGRESSes are found due to the consideration of our minds and therefore they would cease to exist following the cessation of the consideration of mind. Thus, based on the very principles, here too, outline of the resolution is as follows: except for the first object, the rest are found when the INFINITE REGRESS is found in our minds by means of the consideration of our minds. So, whenever we stop our consideration, they would stop as well and therefore there will be no INFINITE REGRESS. Finally, we will have a glance at the INFINITE REGRESS in object objection of some Muslim philosophers that refutes the active intellect to be the truth-maker. We will show that this INFINITE REGRESS in object objection too is an unsatisfactory criticism.

Some arguments against INFINITE REGRESS in Islamic philosophy such as applied proof or argument of ones and thousands are based on the mathematical foundations and preliminaries. Extraction and analysis of these preliminaries exposes mathematical nature of these arguments and shows that besides philosophical approach to these arguments should also look at them from perspective of mathematics. Adopting this perspective becomes clear that the position of these arguments is similar to some paradoxes that have been raised about concept of “large infinity” in mathematics. Using the Cantor’s set theory, mentioned paradoxes were resolved and way of accepting mathematical infinity was paved. Considering mathematical nature of the arguments against INFINITE REGRESS, using the set theory shows that mathematical foundations and preliminaries of mentioned arguments can be vulnerable and consequently, they are unable to prove the impossibility of INFINITE REGRESS.

Some objections to the mental existence that are proposed by the western thinkers, such as the INFINITE REGRESS in the representation, are still unknown to Muslim philosophers: if the mental existence view is accepted, then a mental image will have a “representation”. But, the very “representation” must have another “representation” and so on ad infinitum. In addition to this INFINITE REGRESS, Husserl has also proposed the INFINITE REGRESS in the mental images – that is the very objection of the INFINITE REGRESS in the mental existence and acquired knowledge (al–‘ilm al–ḥuṣūlī) well-known in Muslim philosophy. Muslim philosophers have here suggested the true response that we have knowledge to our mental images by means of knowledge by presence (al–‘ilm al–ḥuḍūrī) and immediately not of acquired knowledge and another mental images. So, there will be no INFINITE REGRESS. Some have thought that the INFINITE REGRESS in the representation objection too can be resolved by the very response. But it is not the case. We will try to find a resolution to the objection based on some of the principles of Muslim Philosophy; in particular of Ibn Sīnā’s Philosophy. Nonetheless, we will see that Few Muslim thinkers can be truly objected to bear some sort of the INFINITE REGRESS in the representation and mental images.

In this essay I try to analyze briefly the claim and proofs of Mu‘tazilite’s nonbeing objects (thubut), Russell's earlier view in Principles of Mathematics, and Russell's later view on negative facts. I, then, indicate that since these claims have been defended and reconstructed even in the recent years, it is necessary to reevaluate such views. Since we should not regard their counter-intuitiveness as sufficient in criticizing them, I attempt to show some of their logical unacceptable consequences: if they are true, they ontologically will result in an INFINITE REGRESS.

In this essay, the first part of Parmenides' dialogue is analyzed. This dialogue presents two challenges to the theory of Forms: "INFINITE REGRESS Arguments" or "Third Man Argument" and "impossibility of knowledge". At first, we try to yield a precise description of the first part of this dialogue, and then by analyzing Parmenides' arguments, we exhibit that his arguments are based on the assumptions of "Self-Predication", "One over Many", "Principle of Non-Identity" and "Principle of Uniqueness". We then make it clear that Parmenides is not justified in applying the assumption of Non-Identity and cannot make an INFINITE REGRESS. Then we deal with the problem of the separation of Forms from the objects of this world and the subsequent "impossibility of knowledge" and by analyzing his arguments we show that Parmenides, in declaring the impossibility of knowledge, has committed at least two logical mistakes, and he then could not conclude that we do not partake of a Form of knowledge.

Among different arguments for the existence of God the Kalam cosmological argument is a very famous one which is elaborated by Professor William lane Craig. Craig claims that the universe began to exist, and then he continues to say: everything that begins to exist has a cause and therefore the universe has a cause. But how do we know that the universe began to exist? This premise forms the most important part of Craig’s contention, and he bolsters it by four arguments, the first two are driven from philosophy and the other two, which he prefers to name them “confirmations from sciences” are driven from sciences; the first one evokes to big bang theory and the seconds to the second principle of thermodynamic which are respectively adopted from cosmology and physics.In this essay we are going to survey Craig’s arguments and estimate their value and weight.

Foundationalism is the most ancient theory on epistemic justification. This theory employs the metaphor of a building. Every building consists of two parts: foundation and superstructure. Superstructure always relies on the foundation. Man"s beliefs are shaped in a similar fashion, i.e., some beliefs are foundations and some are superstructure. This article first shows the principles and different kinds of foundationalism and then discusses the most important argument of its supporters, namely, INFINITE REGRESS argument, and finally shows that from this argument point of view the coherentists are in a better position than foundationalists.

Since the time of Plato, relativism has been attacked as a self-refuting theory. Today, there are two basic kinds of argument that are used to show that global relativism is logically incoherent: first, a direct descendent of the argument Plato uses against Protagoras, called the peritrope; and, second, a more recent argument that relativism leads to an INFINITE REGRESS. Although some relativist theories may be formulated in such a way as to be susceptible to these arguments, there are other versions of relativism that are impervious to these charges of incoherence. First the arguments against relativism will be stated. Next, a radical form of global relativism with assessment sensitivity is introduced, RR. Finally, it is shown how RR can be defended against the challenges of the peritrope and the REGRESS. No attempt is made to defend RR as a plausible theory; however, the usual attempts to show the logical incoherence of radical forms of global relativism fail.